In this paper, we investigate how linguistic information can be incorporated into classical propositional logic. First, we show that Zadeh's extension principle can be justi ed and at the same time generalized by considerations about transformation of possibility measures. Using these results, we show how linguistic uncertainty about the truth value of a proposition leads to the introduction of the notion of a possibilistic truth value. Since propositions can be combined into new ones using logical operators, linguistic uncertainty about the truth values of the original propositions leads to linguistic uncertainty about the truth value of the resulting proposition. Furthermore, we show that in a number of special cases there is truth-functionality, i.e., the possibilistic truth value of the resulting proposition is a function of the possibilistic truth values of the original propositions. We are thus led to the introduction of possibilistic-logical functions, combining possibilistic truth values. Important classes of such functions, the possibilistic extension logics, directly result from the abovementioned investigation, and are studied extensively. Finally, the relation between these logics, and Kleene's strong multi-valued systems is established.
INTRODUCTION
Classical propositional logic deals with propositions, or in other words, a rmative statements that are either true or false. Because the truth value of a proposition can only be either true or false, classical propositional logic is often called two-valued. Propositions can be combined into new ones, using so-called logical operators. Classical logic is truth-functional, because the behaviour of 2 Chapter 1 any logical operator, acting on propositions, can be characterized by a logical function, acting on truth values.
In the beginning of this century, Kleene and others (see, for instance, 25]) addressed an interesting problem. They considered propositions, which are a priori either true or false, but for which there is insu cient knowledge to determine precisely which value in ftrue; falseg the truth value assumes. They asked themselves how a mathematical, logical description of this situation could be constructed. Their solution consisted in the introduction of a number of multi-valued logics, i.e., logical systems with more than two truth values, called strong multi-valued Kleene logics. At least two aspects of Kleene's approach deserve extra attention in the context of this paper. First of all, the truth values used by Kleene are epistemological, because they are not the actual truth values of the propositions involved (a priori true or false), but rather re ect our knowledge about the actual truth values. Ideally therefore, Kleene truth values are mathematical representations of the uncertainty that exists about the actual truth values of the propositions involved. Secondly, Kleene logics are truth-functional. This means that according to these systems, the behaviour of a logical operator is mirrored in a logical function, combining Kleene truth values. To give an example, in these systems it is possible, from the Kleene truth values of two propositions, unequivocally to determine the Kleene truth value of their conjunction.
In the present work, we investigate the problem studied by Kleene in a special case, namely when the uncertainty about the actual truth values of propositions is linguistic. Linguistic uncertainty is the uncertainty contained in (or conveyed by) a rmative statements such as`Wietse is less than one year old' or Linde's temperature is high'. Such statements give us information about, say, Wietse's age or Linde's temperature, but not enough to determine their actual value completely. Due to the imprecision and/or vagueness of the predicates involved (`less than one year old',`high'), such statements convey information, but also contain uncertainty. In 1978, Zadeh proposed the use of possibility measures to mathematically represent linguistic information and, dually, uncertainty 30]. In our doctoral dissertation 9], we have generalized Zadeh's possibility measures, developed a general measure-and integral-theoretic account of possibility theory, and shown that possibility measures are indeed able to represent linguistic information (see also 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] ). On the basis of this work, we show in this paper how a possibilistic logic, representing linguistic uncertainty in classical propositional logic, comes about, and how under a number of additional assumptions, this possibilistic logic leads to Kleene's strong multi-valued systems. In doing so, we at the same time generTowards a Possibilistic Logic 3 alize and provide the possibilistic basis for previous work in this eld, reported on in 16].
In section 2 we have collected the preliminary de nitions and notational conventions, necessary for the proper understanding of the material in this paper. In section 3 we study the transmission of possibilistic (or linguistic) information by mappings, and at the same time give a possibilistic justi cation for Zadeh's extension principle. Using the material of this section, Kleene's problem is addressed in section 4. We consider propositions of the type`(subject) is (predicate)', and show how possibilistic uncertainty about the value the subject assumes in a universe of possible values leads to uncertainty about the truth value of the proposition. This uncertainty can be represented by a possibility distribution on the set ftrue; falseg, called a possibilistic truth value.
Note that possibilistic truth values are descriptions of the uncertainty about the actual truth value (in ftrue; falseg), and are therefore of an epistemological nature. They are the possibilistic counterparts of the Kleene truth values. The next step consists in investigating how the possibilistic truth value of a combination of propositions, using a logical operator, can be calculated. It turns out that in a number of cases, we can associate with a logical operator a possibilistic-logical function, in such a way that the possibilistic truth value of the combination of propositions is the image under this function of the possibilistic truth values of the participating propositions. In other words, our possibilistic logic is indeed in those special cases truth-functional. It also turns out that the possibilistic-logical function involved is a generalized Zadeh extension of the (classical-)logical function associated with the logical operator. We are thus led in section 5 to the introduction of special systems of possibilisticlogical functions, the so-called possibilistic extension logics. We also study the properties of these logics. An interesting special case is considered in section 6, and leads to a possibilistic justi cation for the introduction of strong multivalued Kleene logics. A number of conclusions and open research problems are formulated in section 7.
PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS
Let us start this discussion with a few preliminary de nitions and notational conventions, valid in the rest of this paper, unless explicitly stated to the contrary. By (L; ) we shall mean a complete lattice that is arbitrary but xed throughout the whole text. The bottom element of (L; ) will be denoted by 0 4 Chapter 1 and the top element by 1. We also assume that 0 6 = 1. The meet of (L; ) will be denoted by _, the join of (L; ) by^.
Triangular Norms
A triangular norm (or, shortly, t-norm) T on the complete lattice (L; ) is a binary operator on L that is isotonic, associative and commutative, and that furthermore satis es the boundary condition (8 2 L)(T(1; ) = ). As a corollary, we have for such a t-norm T that (8 2 L)(T(0; ) = 0). Of course, _ is a triangular norm on (L; ), and more speci cally, the only one that is idempotent. For a more involved discussion of triangular norms de ned on complete lattices, and more in general, on bounded partially ordered sets, we refer to 14]. A t-norm T on (L; ) is called completely distributive w.r.t. supremum i for arbitrary in L and an arbitrary family ( j j j 2 J) of elements In this case, the structure (L; ; P) is called a complete lattice with t-norm 14] . In what follows, we shall always denote by T a t-norm on (L; ) that is completely distributive w.r.t. supremum.
Ample Fields
An ample eld R on the universe X is a set of subsets of X that is closed under arbitrary unions and intersections, and under complementation in X. A special ample eld on X, and at the same time the largest, is the power class P(X) of X, i.e. the set of all the subsets of X. In this sense, ample elds on X can be considered as immediate generalizations of this power class. For a more thorough discussion of this subject, we refer to 13, 24] . The atom of R containing the element x of X will be denoted by x ] R and is de ned by:
x ] R def = \ f A j x 2 A and A 2 R g:
Remark that the atom of the ample eld P(X) containing x is precisely the singleton fxg. Therefore, atoms of ample elds can be interpreted as generalizations of singletons. In this light, we also have that
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x 2 x ] R and x ] R 2 R:
A subset E of X will be called R-measurable i E 2 R. Interestingly,
If we look at (1.2), we are led to the introduction of a P(X) ? R-mapping C R , such that for arbitrary A in P(X):
It turns out that C R is the closure operator on P(X), associated with the closure system R 3, 9, 13].
Consider an arbitrary subset A of P(X). Since the intersection of an arbitrary family of ample elds is again an ample eld, we know that In accordance with the terminology introduced by Goguen 20] , an arbitrary X ? L mapping will be called a (L; )-fuzzy set (or simply fuzzy set) in X. It is an obvious generalization of a characteristic X ? L-mapping. The set of the (L; )-fuzzy sets in X will be denoted by F (L; ) (X). A ( 0; 1]; )-fuzzy set in X will also be called a Zadeh fuzzy set, and the set of all Zadeh fuzzy sets in X will be denoted by F(X). A (L; )-fuzzy set h will be called sup-normal i
A X ? L mapping h will be called R-measurable i it is constant on the atoms of R. A R-measurable X ? L mapping|or (L; )-fuzzy set in X|is also called a (L; )-fuzzy variable in (X; R). Whenever we want to omit reference to the structures (L; ) and (X; R), we shall simply speak of fuzzy variables.
A fuzzy variable can therefore be considered as a`fuzzi cation' of a measurable set. Indeed, a subset E of X is R-measurable if and only if its characteristic X ? L-mapping is. The set of the (L; )-fuzzy variables in (X; R) is denoted by G R (L; ) (X). A more detailed treatment of fuzzy variables can be found in 4, 5, 6, 9].
Possibility Measures
A (L; )-possibility measure on (X; R) is a complete join-morphism between the complete lattices (R; ) and (L; ). By de nition, this means that satis es the following requirement: for an arbitrary family (A j j j 2 J) of elements of R: is called a distribution of . Such a distribution is unique, and satis es It is also possible to de ne possibilistic variables, which are possibilistic equivalents of the stochastic variables in probability theory (see, for instance, 2]).
We consider a universe and an ample eld R on . '. We conclude that a Zadeh extension can be interpreted as a generalization| or, more precisely, fuzzi cation|of the notion of a direct image in classical set theory. In the rest of this section, we want to show that Zadeh's extension method nds its origin in the transformation of possibility measures.
Possibilistic Extensions
Let us consider a universe X, provided with an ample eld R, and a variable that assumes values in X. In this paper, we shall be working with the formal mathematical, rather than the intuitive notion of a variable. This means that we assume the existence of a basic space , provided with an ample eld R , and a normalized (L; )-possibility measure on ( ; R ). The distribution of will be denoted by . In the formal picture, X is considered as a The possibility distribution function of is the distribution of , and will be denoted by . We have seen in the previous section (see (1.3) ) that it completely characterizes the possibilistic information about the values that can assume in X. Note that for arbitrary x in X (x) = sup
Remark that, since ?1 (X) = and since is normalized, is normalized as well. The possibility distribution function of moreover is a sup-normal (L; )-fuzzy variable in (X; R).
Besides the universe X we shall now also consider a universe Y and a X ? Y - '(x)] R (') , whence, taking into account the de nition of the closure operator C R (') (see subsection 2.2), e '( A ) = C R (') ('(A)) . We conclude that a possibilistic extension is a generalization|or fuzzi cation|of the notion of a direct image, taking into account certain measurability aspects.
How does this relate to Zadeh's extension principle? Clearly, when R = P(X), and therefore also R (') = P(Y ), we nd for arbitrary y in Y that y ] R (') = fyg. 
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h(x)): Proof. Let us rst show that (i) holds. Consider an arbitrary C Z. Then,
This indeed implies that R ( ') = (R (') ) ( ) . We now proceed to prove (ii).
Consider an arbitrary (L; )-fuzzy variable h in (X; R) and an arbitrary z in Z. We know, taking into account (i) and (1.1), that z ] R ( ') 2 (R (') ) ( ) which is, by de nition, equivalent with ?1 ( z ] R ( ')) 2 R (') , and, taking into account (1.2), also equivalent with ?1 ( z ] R ( ') ) = S
y ] R (') . This implies, taking into account the properties of inverse images, that If we take into account the associativity of supremum in the complete lattice (L; ), (i) and the de nitions of e ' and e , this means that
e '(h) y = e (e '(h)) z = ( e e ')(h) z;
whence indeed ] ' = e e '. 2
Possibilistic t-norm-extensions
We shall now turn to the discussion of an interesting special case, that will play a prominent role in the discussion of possibilistic logic in the following sections.
Let us consider, besides the basic space , n (n 2 N n f0g) universes X k , each provided with an ample eld R k (k = 1 : : :; n). Furthermore, we shall denote by k a possibilistic variable in (X k ; R k ), i.e. a R ? R k -measurable ? X kmapping. We may also consider the product universe X 1 X n , provided with the ample eld R 1 R n , i.e., the product of the ample elds R 1 , .. ., R n (see subsection 2.2). It is easily proven that the ?X 1 X n -mapping ( 1 ; : : :; n ) is a possibilistic variable in (X 1 X n ; R 1 R n ) (see 4, 9] ). On the one hand, for k = 1; : : :; n we may now consider the normal- T n k=1 k (x k ):
As in the previous subsection, we are thus led to the following de nition.
De nition 3 (t-norm-extensions) With a X 1 X n ?Y -mapping ' we can associate a G R1 In other words, f + is the convolution product f f of f and f . Notice the striking formal analogy between (1.12) and (1.13), which is certainly not a coincidence. Both formulas are derived from considerations about transformations of measures. This again indicates that Zadeh's extension principle is by no means an isolated ad hoc principle, but that it rather has its natural place in a much broader measure-theoretical context.
POSSIBILISTIC TRUTH VALUES AND THEIR COMBINATIONS 4.1 Possibilistic Truth Values
Let us apply the results of the previous section to the problem of representing linguistic uncertainty in classical propositional logic, brie y described in the introduction. As far as we know, Van Schooten was the rst to study this problem in his doctoral dissertation 27]. It must however also be mentioned that Gaines has brie y discussed it in his important article about approximate reasoning 19].
We shall rst give a fairly general description of the problem. For a start, consider a property (or predicate) p of the elements of a universe X, that is clear: for every object x in X we have that x either completely satis es or completely does not satisfy p (for more details, we refer to 7, 8, 9] ). With every x in X, we may therefore associate a proposition P p (x) def =`x is p', i.e., an a rmative sentence that is either true or false. P p can be considered as a mapping from the universe X to an appropriate set of propositions, and is therefore also called a proposition function. With P p we can also associate the set A Pp of the objects that satisfy p: A Pp def = f x j x 2 X and x is p g. Moreover, A Pp can also be characterized by its characteristic X ? T -mapping:
AP p : X ! T : x 7 ! true ; x is p false ; x is not p: For arbitrary x in X, AP p (x) is the truth value of the proposition`x is p'. Example 3 Let X = R and let p be the clear predicate`greater than or equal to 10'. Then, of course, A Pp = f a j a 2 R and a 10 g and for arbitrary a in R AP p (a) = true ; a 10 false ; a < 10:
So far, we are able unequivocally to associate with every object x in X the truth value AP p (x) of the proposition P p (x). In the next step of our course of reasoning, we shall introduce linguistic uncertainty into the picture. Let us assume that on the universe X there is de ned an ample eld R of measurable subsets of X. We consider a possibilistic variable in (X; R). As in the previous section, this means that we assume the existence of a basic space , provided with an ample eld R and a normalized possibility measure . X is considered as a sample space, and is a R ?R-measurable ?X-mapping. In the next subsection, we shall take the next step in our course of reasoning, and investigate how the logical combination of propositions (and proposition variables) may lead to an appropriate combination of possibilistic truth values. In the rest of this subsection, we shall add a little more detail to the picture that has been sketched thus far.
First of all, it is important to note that we only work with properties p that are clear. This means that this discussion lies well within the province of classical propositional logic. What we are trying to do here is to add linguistic uncertainty to the classical description. Secondly, it should be clear that the information we derive about the values that AP p ( ) takes in T is really only useful if we are able to separate the information about` is p' being true on the one hand, and about its being false on the other hand. In other words, ftrueg and ffalseg must each be R ( A Pp ) -measurable sets, or equivalently, we must have that R ( This means that the separation of information about the proposition variable` is p' being true or its being false is only possible if A Pp is R-measurable, or, in other words, if, looking through the glasses of R, we may distinguish between objects in X that satisfy p and objects that do not. In the rest of this paper, we shall assume that this is indeed the case, which in particular implies that G R To close this subsection, let us note that, until now, we have always considered the case of just one variable assuming values in a universe X. It is of course Towards a Possibilistic Logic 21 possible to extend these observations to the case of more than one, say n, variables 1 , . .., n assuming values in the respective universes X 1 , . .. , X n (n 2 N n f0g). This is not at all di cult since the treatment of n variables can be considered as a special case of the treatment of one variable by putting = ( 1 ; : : :; n ) and X = X 1 X n . Due to limitations of space, we shall however in this paper leave such an extension implicit. For more details, we refer to our doctoral dissertation 9].
Combination of Possibilistic Truth Values
In the previous subsection, we have shown how possibilistic information about the values a variable may assume in a universe can be transformed into possibilistic information about the truth value of a proposition about this variable. To go to the next stage in our discussion, we observe that, in general, propositions can be combined to form new propositions, using so-called logical operators. In this way, a proposition P can be transformed by the logical negation operator into a new proposition NOT P. By extension, the proposition function P p discussed in the previous subsection can be transformed into a new proposition function NOT P p by the pointwise application of the logical negation operator:
(8x 2 X)((NOT P p )(x) def = NOT(P p (x)) =`x is not p'):
In a completely similar way, the proposition variable P p ( ) def =` is p' is transformed by the logical negation operator into the new proposition variable (NOT P p )( ), de ned as` is not p'. Analogously, the proposition variables is p' and` is q' can be transformed into the new proposition variable (P p AND P q )( ), de ned as` is p AND is q', using the logical conjunction operator AND, and can be transformed into the new proposition variable (P p OR P q )( ), de ned as` is p OR is q', using the logical disjunction operator OR.
As is well known, classical propositional logic is truth-functional, and the behaviour of logical operators can be characterized by what we shall call further on classical-logical functions, i.e., in general T n ?T -mappings, with n 2 Nnf0g.
To give an example, the behaviour of the logical negation operator is mirrored in the behaviour of the complement operator : on the Boolean chain (T ; ), in the following sense: (8x 2 X)( ANOT Pp (x) = : AP p (x)); 22 Chapter 1 where, of course A NOT Pp = f x j x 2 X and x is not p g = coA Pp . In a completely analogous way, the behaviour of the logical disjunction operator is mirrored in the behaviour of the join _ of the Boolean chain (T ; ), in the following sense:
(8x 2 X)( AP p OR Pq (x) = AP p (x) _ AP q (x)); where A Pp OR Pq = f x j x 2 X and (x is p OR x is q) g = A Pp A Pq .
Generally speaking, we can start with n (n 2 N n f0g) clear predicates p 1 , . .., p n with associated sets A Pp 1 , . .. , A Pp n , and with a n-ary logical operator LOP. This logical operator transforms the proposition variables P p1 ( ), . .., P pn ( ) into the new proposition variable LOP(P p1 ; : : :; P pn )( ), de ned as LOP(` is p 1 '; : : :;` is p n '), with associated set A LOP(Pp1; The problem we will treat in this subsection can now be brie y formulated as follows: how, starting with possibilistic information about the values that a possibilistic variable may assume in X, can we derive the possibilistic truth value of the combined proposition variable LOP(` is p 1 '; : : :;` is p n ')? In order to give an answer to this question, we again apply the general results of the previous section.
For a start, the sets A Pp 1 , ... , A Pp n will, as explained in the previous subsection, be assumed R-measurable. Let us now de ne the X ? T n -mapping as follows: def = ( AP p 1 ; : : :; AP pn ). Since the sets A Pp 1 , . .., A Pp n are assumed to be R-measurable, it is easily veri ed that R ( ) = P(T n ):
(1.14)
Using the results of the previous section with Y = T n and ' = , we nd that the ?T n -mapping = ( ) is a possibilistic variable in (T n ; P(T n )). This course of reasoning is summarized in the commuting diagram of gure 4.
In the following counter-example, we show that this truth-functional approach does not necessarily lead to the same result as the possibilistic method described in the previous subsection. In order to apply the truth-functional method, we must calculate e _ T . For arbitrary (t 1 ; t 2 ) in F (L; ) (T ) 2 :
(t 1 e _ T t 2 ) true = sup 1_ 2 =true T(t 1 ( 1 ); t 2 ( 2 )) = sup(T(t 1 (true); t 2 (true)); T(t 1 (true); t 2 (false)); T(t 1 (false); t 2 (true))) and (t 1 e _ T t 2 ) false = sup 1_ 2=false
T(t 1 ( 1 ); t 2 ( 2 )) = T(t 1 (false); t 2 (false)): 
POSSIBILISTIC EXTENSION LOGICS 5.1 Towards a Possibilistic Logic
In this section, we shall take the discussion of the previous section one step further, and look at its results from the standpoint of multi-valued logic (see, for instance, 25]). In other words, we want to investigate how the introduction of possibilistic uncertainty in classical propositional logic leads to the introduction of a special multi-valued logic, with a proper set of truth values and logical functions combining these truth values.
As in the previous sections, we consider a universe X, provided with an ample eld R of measurable sets. Let us brie y summarize what we already know.
In the previous sections, we have seen that possibilistic information about the values that a variable may assume in X, can be represented by a sup-normal These special possibilistic truth values can be interpreted as follows. When a proposition variable` is p' has the (L; )-possibilistic truth value g true, this means that it cannot be false, and is therefore necessarily true, taking into account the information we have about the values that may assume in X. An analogous (dual) interpretation can be given to ] false. When, on the other hand, the proposition variable` is p' has the (L; )-possibilistic truth valuê unknown, this means that, taking into account the information we have about the values that may assume, it is completely possible that the proposition variable is true, and equally possible that it is false. In other words, the truth value of this proposition variable is completely unknown, because of insu cient information about the values that may assume in X.
An important property of classical propositional logic is what could be called its truth-functionality. This means that propositions can be combined to form new propositions using logical operators, the behaviour of which is mirrored in logical functions that turn the truth values of those propositions into the truth values of the new, combined propositions. In other words, with every logical operator, acting on propositions, there can be associated a unique logical function, acting on truth values, that completely characterizes its behaviour. The study of logical functions is of course an important part of classical propositional logic. In the rest of this section, we shall concentrate on the introduction and study of logical functions for the new type of (possibilistic) logic we are creating here, and that is used to model possibilistic uncertainty in classical logic. In the following de nition we explicitly repeat the classical de nition of a logical function, using our notations and terminology (see, for instance, 23] sections 1.6 and 1.7).
De nition 7 (Classical-logical functions) Let n be an element of N n f0g. A T n ?T -mapping is called a classical-logical function of arity n. The set of the classical-logical functions of arity n is denoted by L n . The set of classical-logical functions of arbitrary arity is given the notation L.
Example 6 The conjunction^, the disjunction _ and the implication ), dened on T , are classical-logical functions of arity 2, characterizing the truthfunctional behaviour of respectively the logical conjunction, disjunction and implication operator in classical propositional logic. The negation :, de ned on T , is a classical-logical function of arity 1, characterizing the truth-functional behaviour of the logical negation operator in that logic. 30 Chapter 1 What we now want to do is to extend the classical, truth-functional approach:
we formallyconsider e T as a set of truth values, and look at how such possibilistic truth values can be combined into new ones. After that, we intend to show that at least for some of these combinations, there is a clear and de nite link with combinations of propositions. In this way, we intend to prove that, in some cases, our possibilistic logic is also truth-functional.
De nition 8 (Possibilistic-logical functions) Let n be an element of N n f0g. A ( e T The rationale for the introduction of these extension logics has been given in subsection 4.3. Borrowing the notations from that subsection, we know that false;ûnknowng, and properly restrict a possibilistic extension logic to these sets, a number of interesting observations can be made. The proofs of these observations are straightforward, and will be omitted here. These proofs, and more details, can be found in 9], and for the special case (L; ) = ( 0 Since all elements of e L T are internal in W 2 , restriction of the truth domain of these possibilistic-logical functions to W 2 yields a three-valued logic. Since all triangular norms on (L; ) have the same behaviour in the subset f0; 1g 2 of L 2 , we will nd the same ternary logic for every choice of T. For di erent choices of (L; ), the corresponding ternary logics are furthermore isomorphic. It is easily shown 16] that the truth tables for e :`TjW 2 , ê`T j(W 2 ) 2 , e _`Tj(W 2 ) 2 and f )`Tj(W 2 ) 2 are identical to the corresponding truth tables of the so-called strong ternary logic of Kleene (see, for instance, 25] section 2.5). We shall return to this interesting fact in the following section. 
A Few Properties
In the rest of this section, we shall study the most important properties of some special (L; )-possibilistic-logical functions of arity 1 and 2: e :`T, ê`T , e _`T and f )`T. First of all, it will help us if we can nd simple expressions for these operators. This is the subject of the next proposition. Its proof is straightforward, and is therefore omitted. Let us now investigate the proposition variable` is p AND is q', or equivalently, (P p AND P q )( ), where P p AND P q is a proposition function that is the pointwise conjunction of the proposition functions P p and P q . It is obvious that A Pp AND Pq = A Pp false, whereas t Pp ê`_ t Pq =ûnknown ê`_û nknown =ûnknown. A similar argument can be given for the disjunction. We conclude that there is not necessarily truthfunctionality for the logical disjunction and conjunction operators of classical 12 . In some cases these conditions are not satis ed, and our possibilistic approach is therefore not truth-functional, and therefore does not lead to a strong ternary Kleene logic. In these cases however, the strong ternary Kleene logic does provide us with a conservative approximation, since wherever it goes wrong, it will result in the possibilistic truth valuê unknown, where our possibilistic approach would yield the possibilistic truth values g true or ]
false (see also proposition 2).
CONCLUSION
In the previous sections, we have shown how a possibilistic logic can be constructed. Possibilistic logic can be described as a set of techniques that enable us to incorporate linguistic (possibilistic) uncertainty in classical propositional logic. It turns out that under a number of independence assumptions, possibilistic logic leads to the special case of a possibilistic extension logic. A special subclass of these, the possibilistic-logical _-extensions, are related with strong multi-valued Kleene logics. Thus, a possibilistic justi cation is given for the introduction and use of these Kleene systems.
There are a number of problems, however, which have not been dealt with in this paper. Among them, we explicitly mention the decomposability problem. In classical propositional logic, there exist basic sets of classical-logical functions, such that all other classical-logical functions can be expressed in terms of these functions. The following question can then be asked: is a similar result valid in a possibilistic extension logic, i.e., can any member of this logic be decomposed in terms of a basic set? And if so, what is the relationship between the decomposition of a classical-logical function and the decomposition of its possibilistic-logical extension? A partial answer in the special case (L; ) = ( 0; 1]; ) and T = min has been given in 16], theorem 4.1, although it must be mentioned that the conditions imposed in this theorem are to weak. For a better and more general formulation of this theorem, we refer to 9] chapter 8. Also, in the related domain of reliability theory, we have proven a decomposability property for possibilistic structure functions, which are, for
